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Abstract: Familias en Acción, during more than a decade, has encouraged 
investments in human capital and children’s health in poor households in 
Colombia. The program has been able to benefit a wide range of population to 
such a great extent, that now the program has become a national public policy. 
While the positive effects on health and education have been widely studied, 
there are some other important issues that this program is trying to affect that 
have not been analyzed enough. That is why this study seeks to test the unitary 
model of household behaviour and to measure changes in women’s bargaining 
power inside households. We performed a diff in diff model to see the change 
of the share of the household budget spent on certain assignable and non-
assignable goods in the short and long run. The main results provide evidence of 
a change of the consumption pattern of the household, which leads us to the 
rejection of the unitary model. Also, results give certain evidence indicating that 
women’s bargaining power within the household might have been improved. 
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I. Introduction 
 
In Colombia, since 2001 a conditional cash transfer program (CCT) started in 
order to mitigate the negative effects of the 1999 national crisis. The Familias 
en Acción (FA) focalization program’s main target is to increase the nutrition 
and health levels of children between 0 and 6 years of age, and education 
level children of 7 to 17 years of age (Attanasio and Gómez, 2004). In order 
to accomplish this goal, money in cash was provided to the family. However, 
the money is delivered specifically to the mother of the household in order to 
make sure that schooling assistance and children´s health would increase. 
Besides that, an education/information program for mothers is applied, in 
order to make sure that the money is spend on what it is supposed to.  
 
In order to measure the impact of the program, Familias en Acción has been 
widely evaluated and studied. Most analyses investigate the effects of the 
program on health and education, since this was its main objective (Attanasio, 
et al. 2004). Also, different positive externalities derived from the program 
have been studied, for example child labor and school participation. Thanks 
to the program, they have been reduced and increased respectively, especially 
in urban areas (Attanasio, et al., 2010). Several investigations of the effect of 
the program have been made. All of them were trying to evaluate its impact 
on all the variables it is trying to affect.  However, specific studies of certain 
topics have not been made. That is why the main purpose of this study is to 
measure the effect of the CCT Familias en Acción on intrahousehold resource 
allocation and women’s bargaining power. It is important to analyze how 
Colombian poor allocate and pool their resources, since their behavior can 
have significant effects on public policy. These analyses give a better 
understanding of household behavior and habits when it comes to designing 
public policy. Also, they can give a light on the importance of transferring 
resources directly to women. These analyses show the impact women have on 
resource reallocation inside the household and their bargaining power. We 
 
 
 4 
believe that Colombian households do not behave as a single unit and that 
there are understanding and conflict inside of them. Often, gender roles may 
influence the allocation of the resources. Besides that, we believe that 
transferring resources directly to women is a good first step to their 
empowerment and increase of their bargaining opportunities inside the 
household.  
 
Originally a set of models explaining household behavior were the unitary 
models. They assume that the household behaves as a single individual unit 
that pool its members’ resources and maximizes a unique utility function, 
increasing individuals’ welfare. The allocation of resources inside the 
household depends on one unique member which assigns them depending on 
the marginal productivity of individuals. This means, resources assigned to 
any individual of the household (mother, children, etc.) would not be altered 
in case of an exogenous income received by any member as marginal 
productivities remain unchanged. Several studies have rejected the unitary 
model and the pooling hypothesis. Different authors find that when there is an 
exogenous increase of income, resources are allocated differently to different 
individuals inside the household, depending on who receives that income. 
The spending pattern or share of expenditures on certain goods over the total 
household expenditures is a proxy which is used in order to measure the 
allocation of the resources. Two main types of goods can be differentiated 
inside the household, the public goods, such as food, and the assignable 
goods, such as clothing. The expenditures on assignable goods indicate an 
expense directed specifically to one member. Using the changes of 
expenditures on assignable goods, authors were able to verify changes of 
spending patterns of households. This assumption is the key, since usually 
data do not provide information on which member is consuming more of 
public goods than the others.  
 
There is evidence showing that transferring money directly to women will 
assure that it will be spent on children’s health and education (Gitter, and 
Barham, 2008). That is why CCTs make direct transfer to women, since it is 
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more probable that they will invest in children and human capital than their 
husbands. Besides that, FA (and CCT’s in general) has the underlying 
objective to increase women empowerment by transferring resources directly 
to women inside the household. Some studies have been made that 
investigate if the increase of women’s non-wage income due to CCT’s 
programs can increase their negotiation power inside the household. The 
increase of women’s bargaining power is a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition to increase women empowerment (Molyneux. 2009).  Finding 
evidence showing the increase of women’s bargaining power inside the 
household is a sign, which shows that efforts to empower women in 
Colombian poor households has paid off. However, it is important to take 
into consideration that a bigger set of aspects have to change in order to 
assure a true women empowerment. That is why the FA program provides 
also seminars for women. During the seminars, the women are informed 
about health and social issues. They try to encourage political participation of 
women as well. 
 
Quisumbing and Maluccio (2000) define the four determinants of bargaining 
power inside a household. They are: control over resources, influences that 
can impact the bargaining process, interpersonal networks, and basic 
attitudinal attributes. The authors mention that when it comes to economic 
analysis, the bargaining power is measured on economic resources that are 
exogenous to the labor supply. These resources can be assets, unearned 
income, transfer payment or welfare receipts. The last one is the interest of 
this investigation. We are interested in the control over resources as a 
determinant of bargaining power. The resources are identified as an 
exogenous transfer payment that is given to the mothers by the FA program. 
It is important to highlight that finding the proper bargaining power 
measurement can be difficult due to data limitations. The reason why, is that 
this measurement should be very time and space specific. Recent qualitative 
information has been used from sociology and anthropology to determine the 
proper measurements of bargaining power. Culture has to be analyzed in 
order to determine which measurements of bargaining power may be relevant 
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depending on the case. However, exogenous income gives significant results 
and is the most commonly used.  
 
Quisumbing and Maluccio (2000), explain also factors that can influence the 
bargaining process, such as legal rights, skills and knowledge, education, etc. 
While some of these factors are exogenous to the individuals, some of them 
are highly correlated with their education. The bargaining power can also be 
improved if individuals have the right social networks, memberships in 
organization, etc. Finally, self-esteem, self-confidence and emotional 
satisfaction are attributed to affect bargaining power. These topics are not 
widely addressed in the economic literature, however there are also other 
attempts to increase empowerment, such as, legal awareness, political 
participation, and the use of contraception (Quisumbing and Maluccio 2000).  
 
Since, we are trying to measure the effect of the FA program on spending 
patterns of Colombian households, we are going to take into consideration 
assignable and not assignable goods, such as food, restaurant meals, clothing, 
toys and household toiletries. We will analyze the change of the share of each 
one of them from the total spending of beneficiary households. Theory 
suggests than when women have impact on the decision-making process in 
the household, they spend more money on children and food than their 
husbands. This is why we are going to measure if the shares of spending on 
these goods vary due to an increase of the women’s non-wage income. If 
evidence suggests that the share of spending on these goods changed because 
of the program, we can reject the pooling hypothesis and assure that 
Colombian poor households do not behave under the unitary model. As well, 
if there is an increase of that share of expenditures on goods preferred by 
women, this could be a signal of an increase of women’s bargaining power. 
 
In order to empirically test our hypothesis, we are going to use data from the 
Colombian household surveys that evaluated the program for households in 
municipalities with population under 100,000 habitants in the years, 2002, 
2003 and 2006. With this data designed as a quasi-natural experiment we 
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conduct a difference in differences estimation in order to see the impact of the 
program in the consumption pattern in the short and long term. The main 
results provide evidence of a change of the consumption pattern of the 
household, which leads us to the rejection of the unitary model. It indicates 
that we should investigate the bargaining or collective models more. Also, 
there is a significant increase in non-assignable goods, in contrary to 
assignable goods. Because of this fact, we are more cautious concluding that 
women’s bargaining power is being increased. Nevertheless, food and 
restaurant meals increased due to the program, and in theory, these goods are 
assumed to be preferred by women. Consequently, the results can give certain 
evidence indicating that women’s bargaining power within the household 
might have been improved. Thus, the effort dedicated to empower women 
may have been working.  
 
The document divides as follows. Section two reviews the theory on different 
intrahousehold resource allocation models, the different empirical evidence 
found by other authors, their relevance to this investigation and its relation to 
women bargaining power. Section three examines more deeply women’s 
bargaining power and intrahousehold resource allocation under the CCT’s 
framework. Section four presents more in depth the Familias en Acción 
program and its specifications. Section five jumps to the empirical part of this 
study and talks about the data that is going to be used in the econometric 
analysis. Also characterization of treatment and control groups main features 
is performed. Section six explains used methodology, shows estimations of 
the econometric model and the results found. Finally, in the last section, the 
concluding remarks are presented, as well as limitations and reflections of 
this study.  
 
II. Resource Allocation Household Models: theory and Evidence 	  
 
Models of household behavior have been widely studied in the past in order 
to explain the way households behave and to see how resources are allocated. 
The basic and most popular model in economic theory is the unitary or 
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unified model of household behavior, which has been the predominant for a 
long time. It proposes that in a household of mainly two adults (where there 
may be children or not) one of them makes all the decisions (Basu, 2006). 
Since the majority of the data collected in surveys is at household level, this 
model is useful in the way that it assumes common preferences of members, 
so the household can be treated as a single unit of analysis. In that way, 
individuals’ preferences are added to obtain household preferences. It is 
assumed that all members have identical utility functions and one unified 
budget constraint (Doss, 1996). Another assumption under this framework is 
that households pool their resources and under one utility function welfare is 
maximized for all members. A unique budget constraint exists, where one 
dictator or altruist member marks a consumption pattern and the share of 
public goods on the total budget (Doss, 1996).  
 
Under the unitary model, differences in resource allocation within the 
household are explained by different individual productivities that lead to 
different shares of income of household members (Quisumbing and 
Maluccio, 2000). This means, that endogenous variations of income such as 
labor wage that change marginal productivity or income of individuals would 
lead to a relocation of resources. (Doss, 1996).  In that way, the unified 
household model predicts that exogenous income increase should not alter the 
spending pattern regardless which member receives it. This is explained by 
the theory, since exogenous income does not alter marginal productivity of 
individuals within the household and should not lead to a reallocation of 
resources (Doss, 1996). However, the unified household model can be 
rejected. It happens when an exogenous income given to any member of the 
household does not affect marginal productivity of the members of the 
household, but it changes the expenditure patterns.  
 
There are a lot of studies which present evidence for rejecting the unitary 
model and the income-pooling hypothesis. In order to test for unitary models, 
authors use exogenous changes in income of household members and use 
them as regressors.  
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Lundberg, Pollak and Wales (1997) conduct one of the most important 
studies testing the income-pooling hypothesis in English households in the 
1970s. An exogenous variation of income was introduced. It happened due to 
the change of the beneficiary of the program from the father of the household 
to the mother. With this redistribution of resources inside the household, it 
could be tested if the household pooled the resources or if the wife would 
spend resources in a different way. The authors use the children and women 
clothing relative to the men’s clothing to see changes in the consumption 
patterns. The main results showed that after the policy change, there was a 
substantial increase in expenditures on women and children’s clothing in 
relation to men’s clothing. They argue that children are better off when the 
mothers hold resources, thus they reject the income-pooling hypothesis.  
 
Ward-Batts, J. (2000) expands the research made by Lundberg, Pollak and 
Wales (1997). She uses the same English policy as an exogenous variation of 
income, but a larger set of goods was analyzed. A tobit model is used in the 
study with a larger set of goods including clothing, Tabaco, children’s toys, 
cosmetics, hairdresser, books, among others. Price indexes are used in order 
to account for price changes. Similarly to the previous study, the author 
rejects the pooling income hypothesis. She concludes that a shift of power in 
the decision-making process inside the household was existent and there is a 
significant difference between husband and wife’s allocation of income 
preferences. According to Ward-Batts (2000), women benefited the change in 
the policy, since they were able to spend resources according to their own 
preferences.  
 
The study made by Duflo and Udry (2004) is an example of the rejection of 
the income-pooling hypothesis in developing economies. The authors study 
the resource allocation within households in Ivory Coast. Specialization in 
crops cultivation by gender makes it possible to differentiate incomes 
obtained by husband and wife. The authors use rainfall as an exogenous 
variation since different crops are sensitive to specific types of rainfall 
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shocks. In this way, authors find that income generated by females is spent 
differently than income generated by males. The female crop income shifts 
spending more towards food compared to men crop income. These facts 
violate the main assumptions of the collective household models. According 
to the authors these households behave similarly to the model of informal 
insurance with limited commitment. In this model, the income is allocated 
differently depending on the identity of the income earner and the origin of 
the income. 
 
Finally, Quisumbing and Maluccio (2000) evaluate the unitary model in four 
different countries: Bangladesh, Indonesia, Ethiopia, and South Africa. 
Individual variables such as human capital and controlled assets at the time of 
marriage are used as a measurement of bargaining power. They reject the 
unitary model and find that women tend to spend more on children’s 
education and clothing in all the cases.  
 
Important political implications can be derived from the rejection of unitary 
model. Under the unitary model framework, as said before, it is irrelevant 
which member of the household increases their non-wage income, since 
decision in resource allocation should not vary. However, when the unitary 
model is rejected, it implies that resources given to a certain individual can 
increase certain individual’s welfare more than the others (Basu, 2006). These 
implications must be present when it comes to designing public policies, 
especially if their aim is to benefit some members of the household more than 
the others.   
 
On the other hand, the role of the women in the household can vary 
depending on a different set of factors, such as culture, income, education, 
how much she contributes to the total income, etc. Now, it is widely accepted, 
that women participate in decision-making process inside the household. 
Their preferences may be different from husbands’ preferences. This situation 
may also contradict the unitary model.  
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Given the multiple rejection of the unitary model in different studies around 
the world, a new variety of models accepting the preference heterogeneity 
inside the household have risen. Since evidence show that depending on the 
identity of the member that experiences a non-wage income increase, 
different household decisions are made. The models accept that household 
individuals have different preferences and decisions depending on a power 
balance between husband and wives (Basu, 2006). The idea that households 
are not units that represents a common preference has become more popular. 
Now, it is believed that there are conflicts and cooperation inside households, 
which lead to power struggle and bargaining situations.  
 
Basu (2006) talks about the collective approach for modeling the household.  
It is based on the idea that husband and wife have different utility functions. 
The household maximizes a weighted average of both functions, where the 
weights represent the power each part has in the household. The weight of the 
wife may vary due to different factors, such as wage, more specifically how 
much she earns, or even cultural factors. In this case, when individuals face a 
budget constraint, income is not being fully pooled in the household. 
Individuals have to bargain over how much they contribute to the household 
and over expenditures patterns for the household more than for themselves 
(Basu, 2006).  
 
With the collective model approach, it is possible to describe intrahousehold 
resource allocation under certain assumptions. Therefore, it is possible to see 
changes in the expenditure share when there are exogenous changes in the 
economic environment. Main assumptions state that goods are private, and 
individuals include other members’ utility functions in their own utility 
functions. Also, it is assumed that the sub utility function of each member is 
separable from private consumption. Moreover, at least one private good can 
be assigned to one member of the household, so it is known who consumes it 
(Doss, 1996). The author explains also how the collective model is very 
general and that the unified model and the cooperative bargaining model are 
its restricted cases. 
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Thomas (1990) tests the collective model in another way. He investigates 
effects of unearned income of husband and wives on the nutrient intakes, 
fertility and child survival. In that same direction Schultz (1990) analyze the 
unearned income of each spouse and its effect on labor supply and fertility.  
 
Lundberg and Pollack (1993) also develop a model called the separate 
spheres model, inside the category of the bargaining models. In this model, 
wife and husband cooperatively bargain over production of household goods 
or children. This model can lead to a consensus by part of both spouses or the 
consensus cannot be achieved, which means gender roles define the 
equilibrium. In general, the cooperative bargaining models predict that 
changes in earnings of an individual will affect the distribution within the 
household (Doss, 1996).  
 
Under the bargaining model, when we investigate if women increase their 
bargaining power in the household, we have to look at her decisions on food 
related expenditures. They may reflect that as wife’s earnings increase, she 
has greater influence on the household’s spending pattern. Increases of 
expenditures on certain goods may reflect women preferences, for example 
expenditures on restaurant meals (Phipps and Burton, 1998). This behavior 
may also can be explained under the pooling hypothesis, where consumption 
of food outside home depends on the costs of substitutes, and where the 
“wife’s wage is an important component of the cost of home prepared meals” 
(Lundberg, Pollak and Wales, 1997. p.465). This reflects the importance of 
looking at variations of income that are exogenous instead of variation of 
women’s wages. The changes of women’s wages do not reflect increases of 
women’s power inside the household, especially under unitary models. 
 
Finally, another set of models of resource allocation within the household are 
the non-cooperative models. These models assume that income is not pooled, 
therefore individuals have their own preferences, consumption, production, 
and independent decisions. In these models the bargaining process determines 
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the level of public goods in the household. Which means, the level reached is 
endogenous (unlike the non-cooperative situations of the cooperative models, 
where gender roles define the level), and determines how much each member 
has to spend in public goods.  
 
In summary, non-unitary models assume that decisions made by men and 
women are different. They can be cooperative or not when it comes to 
expenditures. An imbalance in the bargaining power affects the decisions on 
consumption inside the household. The models assume that women are more 
interested in investing in health and education of their offspring. That is why 
these models predict that an increase of non-wage income of the women 
would increase consumption of these goods. This causes that cash transfer 
programs transfer resources directly to women in order to increase the share 
of expenditures of shared goods of household (Gitter and Barham, 2008).  
 
III. CCT’s, Intrahousehold Resource Allocation and The Role of 
Women 
 
Conditional Cash Transfers may help to empower women in the household, 
since in theory women are more interested in children welfare. In that case, 
giving more resources to women, in theory, will increase her bargaining 
power inside the household. Since the increase of women’s income may lead 
to increase of conflict inside the household, the conditionality of the program 
should solve this problem. Conflicts over investment in child human capital 
would be resolved (De Janvry and Sadoulet, 2006). 
  
As said before, the CCT program FA gives resources strictly to the mother in 
the household, so they will be allocated towards children. There is also an 
underlying objective of increasing her bargaining power. Women 
empowerment is assumed to be the change in the family and social 
conditions, and power that women face. The family and social conditions of 
the mother can be measured thought her income, resource administration and 
spending decisions, choices about health education and nutrition within the 
household, domestic labor, social participation, participation in educative 
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seminars, among others (Attanasio, et al.. 2006).  
 
Attanasio and Lechene (2002) analyze data on Mexico’s CCT program 
Pogresa (currently Oportunidades). They test for global pooling of resources 
within households. They use the government’s transfer as an exogenous 
variable. The dependent variable is the wife’s income share in food, clothing, 
tobacco and alcohol. It is found that the share of income of the wife affects 
the expenditure structure. In the share of women’s income, the share of food 
decreases, while the share of children’s clothing increases. The authors 
conclude that in the majority of households the patterns of consumption 
varies when women are receiving the grant. It leads them to reject the unitary 
model.  
 
Gitter and Barham (2008), use the Nicaraguan CCT program Social Safety 
Net (RPS) to examine its impact on women spending on school enrollment of 
their children, and food. They use the ratio of years of schooling of female to 
male household heads as a measure of bargaining power. The authors find 
evidence that the program improved the allocation of resources to women and 
children, increasing school enrolment by about 20%. However, they find that 
this increase is due to an income effect. The fact that the transfers are directed 
to women plays a secondary role. The authors highlight the importance of 
obtaining a better measurement of women power besides the spending pattern 
in the data. Those measures cannot directly estimate the effects of targeting 
transfers to women. They remind us of the importance of obtaining better 
variables, which can be collected in the surveys. It would improve the 
knowledge about the efficacy of transferring resources to women in their 
empowerment.  
 
De la Brière and Quisumbing  (2000) try to examine the impact of Progresa 
on women status and intrahousehold relations. They use a set of eight 
questions asked in surveys. These surveys gather information on who takes 
decisions inside the household respect to several issues, such as: medical 
attention, authority over children, decisions on extra-income, expenditures, 
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among others. They use a multinomial logit model in order to find increases 
in the probability of women making important decisions in the household. 
They find that in the poorest households there is an increase of the probability 
of women deciding by themselves upon the use of extra income. On the other 
hand, these authors relate how Progresa affects women’s empowerment by 
increasing their resources, creating a network of cobenefitiaries, periodical 
meetings, among others. They highlight the difficulty of finding the pathways 
by which a CCT program can affect the women’s status and itrahousehold 
relations. This status is difficult to quantify, thus households surveys can lead 
to misleading interpretations if they are not taken with precaution, and if the 
socio cultural context is not properly assessed.  
 
IV. Familias en Acción Program 
 
CCTs are born under the social safety nets policies; their main objectives are 
decreasing poverty and minimizing the economic risks in the presence of 
shocks. These programs started being implemented in Latin America during 
the 90’s decade in response to the different crises faced by the region. They 
were considered necessary since the traditional economic growth model 
wasn’t able to reduce the permanent high poverty and inequality levels in the 
region (Attanasio & Pellerano, 2012). 
 
Under this framework, program Familias en Acción was created as a response 
to the economic crisis in Colombia at the end of the 90s decade. The program 
was adopted from the Mexican CCT program Progresa (currently 
Oportunidades). Under this scenario FA aimed to reduce poverty by fostering 
human capital accumulation, mitigating the effects of the crisis, minimizing 
risk in presence of economic shocks, and making sure that the most 
vulnerable households could keep their income. The program’s main 
objective is to contribute to the formation of human capital in families in 
extreme poverty situation, complementing the income of households in which 
there are children under 18 years of age. In that way, more food would be 
consumed, better nutritional habits would be adopted, and health and nutrition 
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of children under seven years of age would be improved.  Besides that, it is 
priority to foster and increase school attendance in primary and secondary 
school (Attanasio and Pellerano, 2012). 
 
The main idea of the program is to invest in human capital through the 
demand side. Three main channels of achieving this goal are education, 
health, and nutrition. The idea is to provide money to families conditioned to 
several requisites they must accomplish in order to receive it. Attanasio and 
Pellerano (2002), assure that a proper strategy to alleviate poverty has to have 
two main components. First, an income transfer that would increase 
consumption in the short term and would act as an insurance against 
economic shocks faced by the most vulnerable population. Second, medium 
term policies that generate a sustained increase in households’ assets. 
Increase in human capital is accomplished if the money transferred to 
families is invested specifically in children’s education and health. One of the 
main assumptions of the program is that there is not enough investment in 
human capital by parents in poor households. Main reasons for that are 
market failures and undervaluation of the positive externalities human capital 
accumulation brings. With the implementation of the program those 
difficulties can be overcome, so human capital accumulation in the society 
can be achieved. Therefore, intergenerational reproduction of poverty can be 
alleviated in the long run.  
 
As mentioned before, the FA program has three main components: education, 
health and nutrition. The largest component is education, which consists of a 
cash transfer to households in which there are children between 7 and 17 
years of age. Families receive a subside of 15.000 (approximately $7.95 
USD) pesos monthly for each child in primary school and 30.000 pesos 
(approximately $15.90 USD) for each child in secondary school. Money is 
transferred only if children attend to at least at 80% of the classes in one year 
(Attanasio and Pellerano, 2012). Attanasio and others (2010) mention that in 
families, which were already sending children to school before the grant, the 
transfer is not conditional and would only represent an exogenous increase of 
 
 
 17 
the income. This situation can affect changes in resource allocation and 
decision-making process inside the households. In the nutrition component, 
families receive 50.000 pesos (approximately $26.50 USD) monthly if there 
are children between 0 and 6 years of age. This quantity is fixed regardless 
the number of children in the household. This money is given on the 
condition that children assist regularly to growth and development check-ups.  
 
Originally the program was targeted to rural population in extreme poverty, 
and to the displaced population. Later, in 2006, a second phase started, the 
program was extended in order to cover a wider range of municipalities, 
including urban areas and indigenous communities. In 2002, 320.000 families 
in 622 municipalities were chosen as beneficiaries of the program. A total of 
691 municipalities were granted with the subside between 2001 and 2004. 
Ten years later, the program beneficiated a total of 2.8 million families in 
more than one thousand municipalities, of which 62% are rural. Familias en 
Acción has become the biggest program ever implemented by the government 
in order to help poor people. Thanks to its success in 2012 it was adopted as a 
national law (Attanasio and Pellerano, 2012).  
 
In order for a municipality to be eligible to qualify for the program a set of 
requirements must be fulfilled. First, the municipality’s population must be 
lower than 100.000 habitants and the municipality cannot be a capital of a 
department. What is more, a municipality has to have a significant health and 
education infrastructure. Moreover, there has to be at least one bank in the 
municipality. Finally, the municipality’s administration should show interest 
in the program by applying and gathering all the required documents 
(Attanasio and Pellerano, 2012).  From the selected municipalities, 
households that are eligible to qualify for the program should fulfill two 
requirements. First, there have to be children between 0 and 17 years of age 
in a household. Second, a household has to be registered as Sisben level 1 by 
the 31st of December of 1999. Sisben is an indicator widely used in 
Colombia and is composed by a number of variables related to poverty 
(Attanasio and Pellerano, 2012).  
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Finally, to assure that resources are going to be spent on children’s education 
and nutrition, the subsidy is given to mothers inside the beneficiary 
households. The program also develops other activities, such as, comities for 
leader mothers, and talks that cover a variety of topics (prenatal care, 
prevention of accidents in the house, children’s nutrition, among others). 
However, these activities are not mandatory. Also, another reason why the 
subside is given only to the mother is to empower women in the decision 
making inside the household. Also, with the additional education given to the 
mother, it is expected that bargaining power and the allocations of resources 
will increase.  
 
V. Data Analysis 	  
The main objective of this investigation is to test if the spending patterns of 
Colombian households changed after receiving the Familias en Acción 
transfer. The main interest are the changes in the share of expenses on food 
and clothing after the implementation of the program. In this way, we try do 
address some conclusions on household behavior and women’s bargaining 
power. In the formal test, we use the databases of the program evaluation 
available in the Colombian DNP (Departamento Nacional de Planeación) 
website. This evaluation was made by the research institute (Econometria), 
and SEI a firm which was in charge of the data collection. The evaluation 
started in December of 2001. 
 
Originally FA, modeling Oportunidades, was designed to be randomly 
assigned. However, due to political issues and the severity of the crises, the 
allocation of resources of the program started sooner than it was planned. The 
resources were given to the largest possible number of municipalities 
(Attanasio et al., 2010). In this situation, a control group was carefully 
designed to ensure that control municipalities were as similar as possible to 
the treated ones in terms of population and quality life index. As Attanasio 
and others (2010) explain, a representative stratified sample of treatment 
municipalities was constructed. Municipalities that belonged to the same 
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strata but were excluded from the program were chosen as control. There two 
main reasons why certain municipalities were chosen to be a control group 
that differentiated from the treatment group; lack of banking institutions, and 
the fact that some of the municipalities had not finished all the application 
procedures at that time.  
 
With this information, a baseline survey, a first, and a second follow surveys 
up for municipalities under 100.000 habitants was carried out. The Baseline 
survey took place during June and October of 2002 for a total of 11.500 
households. These households belonged to 122 different municipalities from 
which 57 were treatment and 65 control. The first follow up was carried out 
between July and November of 2003. 10.742 households were surveyed 
again, which represents 94% of the original sample. Finally, a second follow 
up was carried out between November of 2005 and April of 2006, with a total 
of 9.566 households surveyed in the 122 municipalities. 
 
As mentioned before, the program started earlier than the evaluation, thus the 
baseline survey could not be carried out before the start of the program. As a 
result, in the baseline survey a portion of treatment households was already 
receiving the cash transfers. In the treatment group a total of 3,558 
households were receiving resources when the evaluation started, while 3,215 
were not receiving it yet. In this way, the baseline survey differentiates 
between two treatment groups: Treatment with payment and treatment 
without payment. Under these circumstances, two control groups were 
created. The first one, named control with payment, was intended to be 
similar to the treatment with payment. The second one, named control 
without payment, was intended to be similar to the treatment group which 
wasn’t receiving the payment yet (or treatment without payment). During the 
first follow up, both treatment groups were receiving the transfer. Hence, only 
two groups were differentiated: the control and the treatment group. During 
the second follow up, 13 municipalities from the control started receiving the 
program as well. Consequently, they changed status and became treatment 
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municipalities. To sum up, in 2006, there were 70 municipalities in the 
treatment group and 52 were in the control group.  
 
As stated previously, in the baseline survey there is a group of households 
which was already receiving the treatment. Since they did not contain any 
preprogram information, those 3,558 households had to be eliminated from 
the base year sample. However, the information on these households gathered 
in the other two surveys is used in this evaluation. Also, it is important to 
highlight that in the group “treatment without payment”, households had been 
aware that they would be receiving the transfer in the future.  In that case, it is 
probable that households had been anticipating the money, consequently they 
had started changing their consumption patterns before they received the 
grant. It is important to take into consideration, that this effect may bias the 
econometric results.  Evidence of an anticipation effect is found in the results. 
We address this topic in the final section.  
 
Since the program was not assigned randomly, the accurate evaluation 
depends on a definition of the proper treatment and control groups. Taking 
into consideration significant differences between control and treatment 
group in observable characteristics before the program was implemented is 
the key to our analysis. We can control for characteristics that were different 
before the program started, which would make the comparison between the 
two groups more accurate. If we control for those observable characteristics 
differences, the outcome after the program can be attributed to the program 
itself and not to original differences between groups. 
 
In the empirical testing we are going to use a quasi-experimental approach to 
evaluate the program. In that case, there is a need to take into consideration a 
big number of household characteristics in order to observe as much 
information as possible. The survey present different household 
characteristics and has information about a big set of features. Balancing the 
groups would guarantee that we would compare similar groups, consequently 
the estimations can be more accurate.  
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Table 1 presents regional and physical characteristics of households. These 
characteristics are assumed to stay constant in time regardless of whether 
households receive the program later on. The table presents the baseline year 
comparisons between the treatment without payment group and the control 
group. The third column presents the difference between the groups (obtained 
by the subtraction between both groups). The fourth column shows the p-
values from a t-test performed in order to measure significant differences 
between the groups. If the p-value is 0.05 or lower we can reject the 
hypothesis that differences between treatment and control are not statistically 
significant under a 95% level of confidence. 
 
Table 1. Regional and Physical Household Characteristics. Treatment and Control 
Group 
Proportion of HH (%) Treatment Control Difference P-value     
Region of Residence 
     
 
Atlantic 36.92 41.68 -4.76 0.000 
 
 
Central  28.13 21.91 6.22 0.000 
 
 
Oriental 20.53 21.84 -1.31 0.160 
 
 
Pacific 14.42 13.72 0.70 0.378 
 House Walls 
     
 
Brick 44.18 46.25 -2.07 0.070 
 
 
Clay 9.23 13.15 -3.92 0.000 
 
 
Tree Bark 30.53 18.99 11.54 0.000 
 
 
Wood 11.77 16.72 -4.95 0.000 
 
 
Residuals 1 1.44 -0.44 0.088 
 
 
No walls 0 0.11 -0.11 0.066 
 Type of Residency 
     
 
House 96.5 95.52 0.98 0.031 
 
 
Apartment 0.69 0.76 -0.07 0.709 
 
 
Room 2.65 2.62 0.03 0.919 
 Own House 66.93 62.85 4.08 0.000 
 Rented House 10.48 8.88 1.60 0.017 
 Occupied house 3.72 6.36 -2.64 0.000 
 House in Usufruct 18.84 20.98 -2.14 0.020 
 Piped Water 72.37 72.17 0.20 0.845 
 Fridge 26.81 32.59 -5.78 0.000 
 Electricity 83.51 87.52 -4.01 0.000 
 Gas 
 
5.76 7.78 -2.02 0.001 
 Sewage 64.49 63.92 0.57 0.609 
              
Note: Approximately 5600 observations 
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As we can see, there are some statistically significant differences between 
treatment and control household characteristics. There are differences in the 
proportion of households living in the Atlantic and Central region. We can 
also find significant differences in the proportion of households that have 
walls made out of clay, tree bark, and wood. There are also some statistically 
significant differences in characteristics describing the wealth of a household. 
They can be found in the characteristics such as possession of a fridge, access 
to electricity, and access to gas. This physical characteristics of the household 
that are statistically different in treatment and control groups can be observed 
and can be controlled in the econometric analysis. These characteristics 
cannot be changed due to receiving the transfer, so they can be assumed 
constant in time. In this situation, they can be used as controls.  
 
 
Table 2. Socio-Demographic Household Characteristics. Treatment and Control Group 
Proportion of HH (%) Treatment Control Difference P-value     
Head of the Household 
     
 
Age 44.19 45.31 -1.12 0.000 
 
 
Gender 79.88 81.03 -1.15 0.204 
 
 
Incomplete Primary School 44.62 43.12 1.50 0.186 
 
 
Complete Primary School 15.33 13.93 1.40 0.083 
 
 
Incomplete Secondary School 8.83 9.73 -0.90 0.176 
 
 
Complete Secondary School 3.47 3.38 0.09 0.829 
 
 
Affiliated Health Insurance 35.67 53.96 -18.29 0.000 
 
 
Affiliated Pension System 67.33 68.86 -1.53 0.152 
 Age Mother of the Household 38.05 39.07 -1.02 0.000 
 Single Parent  19.96 19.07 0.89 0.323 
 Total Number people in the HH 6.08 6.02 0.06 0.313 
 Number of Children  3.21 3.65 -0.44 0.000 
 Pregnant woman in the HH 3.42 1.63 1.79 0.000 
 Total Income HH (Pesos 2002) 438652.9 444917.7 -6264.80 0.601 
              
Note: Approximately 5600 observations 
     
 
Similarly, Table 2 presents some sociodemographich indicators of households 
divided by treatment and control group in the base year.  It can be seen, that 
there are statistically significant differences between groups in age of the 
head of the household, and age of the women in the household. Also, there is 
statistically significant difference in the variable describing affiliation to the 
 
 
 23 
health system (EPS). The number of children in the household, which is a 
variable that is directly correlated with the dependent variables of our model, 
present statistically significant difference among groups. In this table, there 
are some observables that can be controlled in our formal analysis in order to 
capture the true effect of the program.  
 
VI. Methodology and Results 
 
Given the way the data is constructed (no randomization), a quasi-
experimental model can be constructed in order to see the effect of the 
program on food and clothing consumption. In the baseline survey, the data 
on household’s consumption pattern before the program is available. 
Subsequently, the two other surveys report post-program household 
consumption pattern. With this information, the data from the baseline and 
the first follow up can be used in order to perform a short-term analysis. 
Correspondingly, it is also possible to execute a long-term analysis using the 
baseline and both follow up surveys. Based on the data, a difference in 
differences model is going to be performed in order to see the program 
impact on consumption. As already stated, the statistically significant 
differences in observable characteristics of control and treatment group are 
going to be use as controls in the model to avoid bias. Including controls not 
only removes systematical differences between groups, but it also reduces 
error variance (Wooldridge, 2012). The difference in differences estimation 
can correct for the unobservable characteristics if we assume that they are 
constant in time.   
 
The difference in differences model allows to evaluate the effect of a policy 
or event that affect only a group of individuals. This method is commonly 
known as quasi-experimental. Because of the fact that the data is not 
randomized, the application of a treatment differentiates the treated and the 
control group by itself. The basic definition of the diff in diff model is that in 
a two period framework with two groups, one of them is exposed to the 
policy or treatment in the second period. This means, that in the first time 
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period both treatment and control groups are not exposed to the policy or 
treatment. Nevertheless, in the second period only one group is exposed to the 
treatment. That is why this group receives the name of treatment group. The 
estimation of the effect of the treatment is made by differentiating between 
groups and time, a double difference estimation.  
         (  𝑌!,!"#$%" −   𝑌!,!"#$%) − (  𝑌!,!"#$%" −   𝑌!,!"#$%)   
 
The equation above illustrates how the method works. The outcome Y from 
the treatment group from the period one is compared to the outcome Y from 
the treatment group from the period two. Similarly, the outcome Y from the 
control group from the period one is compared to the outcome Y from the 
control group from the period two.  Now, both differences are subtracted, 
which gives us the effect of the program on the outcome of interest Y. The 
intuition behind this method is that since treatment and control groups are 
similar, they should behave in the same way during time. Any difference 
presented between these two groups after the intervention can be attributed to 
the program.  
 
Note that the notation is 𝑌 since this represents the average outcome of each 
group. The effect of the program is measured by the difference of average 
outcomes. That is why there is no need to use panel data for this estimation, 
and a pooling cross section is enough. As stated before, we eliminated the 
treatment group with payment from our base year sample, because 
preprogram information was not available. However, this data still can be 
taken it into consideration in the first and second follow up. It can be done, 
because our outcome is going to represent changes in the average share of 
expenditures on clothes and food in each group in specific period.  
 
In the database we calculated several ratios. All of them were constructed in a 
similar way: expenditures on one specific good over total expenditures. To 
obtain these rations we used data on expenditures on following goods: men’s 
clothing, women’s clothing, male children’s clothing, female children’s 
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clothing, baby clothing, food, and restaurant meals. There are three time 
periods: the baseline survey of 2002, labeled as year 0; the first follow in year 
2003, denominated as year 1; and the second follow up in 2006, named year 
2. We created a dummy variable for the short term analysis. It takes the value 
of 1 for households in municipalities that were in the treatment group without 
payment in the base year and remained in the treatment group in year 1. The 
dummy takes value of 0 for households in municipalities that were control 
with and without payment in base year and in the first year remained in the 
control group. For the long term evaluation, we created a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 for households in municipalities that were treatment 
without payment in the base year, treatment in the year 1 and treatment in the 
year 2. The households from the municipalities that were control in the base 
and first year, but became treatment in the second year are not taken into 
consideration. The reason why, is because we are interested in a long-term 
effect. If we used that data, we would also observe the effect of the program 
from one period to another. The dummy for treatment in the long term takes 
the value of 0 for households in municipalities that were control during the 
three periods of time.  
 
The following difference in differences model was performed:  
 𝑌!"     =   𝛽! +   𝛿!𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟!" +   𝛽!  𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡! +   𝛿!  𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟!"  𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡! +   𝛿!𝕏!" +   𝜇!" 
 
Two set of regressions were run separately for the different outcome 
variables. One for the short term (years 0 and 1) and one for the long term 
(years 0, 1 and 2). 𝑌!"    represents the outcome variable separately for each 
household for long and short term. Variable 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟!" is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one the year the program takes place, t=1 or t=2. As 
described above, the variable 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡! acts as follows. In the short-term, 
it equals 1 for treatment without payment in year zero and treatment with 
payment in year 1, zero otherwise. In the long term, it equals 1 for the 
treatment without payment in year zero, treatment with payment in the year 1 
and treatment in the year 2, zero otherwise. Parameter 𝛿! is the parameter of 
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interest. It accompanies the interaction term between the year dummy after 
policy intervention and the treatment groups. The parameter captures the 
difference in differences estimation and shows the effect of the program on 
our variables of interest. Finally 𝕏!" is a vector contiaining all the observable 
characteristics that presented significant difference between treatment and 
control groups. Using this model, unobservables constant in time are 
eliminated, which reduces the bias. 
 
Table 3 shows the estimation of the diff in diff model in the short term. Each 
column displays each outcome variable: expenditure on one specific good 
over the total household expenditure. We reported coefficients as follows. 𝛿! 
the coefficient of the dummy variable year1, which indicates the average 
change of the dependent variable from the year 0 to 1. The coefficient 𝛽! of 
the dummy variable treatment in the short term. It represents how the shares 
of total spending would have changed in the absence of the policy. The 
coefficient of interest 𝛿! of the interaction term between the two dummies. It 
shows the impact of the transfer in the post program period. We control for a 
wide set of variables that are presented in Table 1 of the Appendix. This 
vector of control variables includes the variables that were significantly 
different between control and treatment group, plus some transformations, 
and other important variables that may affect our outcome.  
 
From the estimations we find no evidence of an increase in the share of 
expenditures on any clothing-related good. The coefficient of interest presents 
a negative sign for men, women, male and female children’s clothing. This 
means that the policy could have had a decreasing effect on the expenses on 
these items over the total household spending. However, none of these 
coefficients is statistically significant under any confidence level, which 
means that the program did not change the pattern of consumption of clothes 
between the years 2002 and 2003. Regarding to the share of food, we find 
that all coefficients are statistically significant under 1% confidence level. We 
can see, that there is an average decrease of 0.02 in the share of food for both 
treatment and control group. We can also see, that if the policy hadn’t been 
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implemented, the share of expenditures on food would have been higher by 
0.008. Finally, it is shown that households beneficiaries of FA program 
increased the share of consumption on food over total expenses on average by 
0.006 between the years 2002 and 2003. We find a similar result for 
restaurant meals or meals outside the house. The share for both groups 
decreased by 0.003 from one year to another. Before the subsidy, on average, 
the treatment group had been spending a bigger share of the total budget on 
restaurant meals than the control group. Finally, we can see a significant 
impact of the cash transfer that increased, on average, the share spent on 
restaurant meals by 0.007. 
 
Table 3. Short Term Difference in Differences Estimates. Program Impact on Spending 
Proportion of 
Good on 
Total 
Spending 
Men's Clothes 
Women's 
Clothes 
Male 
Children's 
Clothes 
Female 
Children's 
Clothes 
Baby's 
Clothes 
Food 
Restaurant 
Meals 
Toiletries Toys 
          Year 1 0.0028189 -0.0006721 -0.0019018 0.0042106 -0.0077259 -.021049*** -.002773*** -.0019072* -0.005592 
 
(.0090846) (.0047037) (.005956) (.0060963) (.0109664) (.0033451) (.0002874) (.0009889) (.0063129) 
          Treatment 0.0032312 0.0049901 0.0020596 0.0055493 0.0002485 .0089364*** .0008107*** -.003397*** -0.006402 
Short Term (.0050606) (.0038665) (.0037009) (.0037334) (.0072237) (.0020768) (.0002514) (.0006316) (.0043894) 
          TreatmentY1 -0.0008522 -0.0080149 -0.0035474 -0.0028499 0.0053843 .0058054** .0007155** .0031429*** .0091433* 
 
(.0073904) (.0056468) (.0051335) (.0052302) (.0100886) (.0029129) (.0003516) (.0008706) (.0053433) 
          Cons .0607763*** .1088152*** .0935229*** .0645712*** .1059785*** .1241594*** .0039564*** .0349761*** 0.0011179 
 
(.0157763) (.008512) (.0117473) (.0117936) (.0209364) (.0050344) (.0005799) (.0019254) (.0101737) 
                   
R-square 0.0855108 0.0643885 0.0948227 0.0666039 0.0530393 0.0698628 0.0329723 0.0576369 0.0629556 
N 1073 1414 1581 1635 666 10671 13105 9970 179 
                    
Note: standard errors in parenthesis. Statistically different from zero at 1%(***), 5% (**) and 10%(*) level.  
	   
 
Another non-assignable good on which the program had a positive and 
significant effect is household toiletries. The policy increased the share spent 
on this type of products on average by 0.003. The effect of the policy is 
positive regardless the fact, that before receiving the subsidy the treatment 
group had been spending less on this types of products than the control group. 
Finally, there is a small significant effect on expenses on one assignable 
variable - children’s toys. After the implementation of the program, the 
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treatment group increased the spending share on toys on average by 0.009. It 
can be established, that in the short term, the program has a significant effect 
mostly on non-assignable goods. In households which benefited from the 
program, the share of expenditures on food, restaurant meals, and toiletries 
increased due to the subsidy. Regarding non-assignable goods, we find a 
significant evidence that, before the program, treatment households had been 
spending a bigger share of their budget on these items, compared to the 
control group. This information may give evidence about the existence of an 
anticipation effect in the treatment group due to the implementation of the 
program. However, we will discuss this issue later on.  
 
In Table 4, we can see the results of the estimations in the long-term effect, 
i.e. from 2002 to 2006. Again, each column shows the expenditure on each 
good over total household consumption. Once more, we report the three 
coefficients of interest and we omit to report the control variables, which are 
specified in Table 1 of the Appendix. In the long term, we consider that the 
treatment group consists only of the households from municipalities that have 
been treatment since 2002. In this way, we can see the impact of the program 
after 4 years of its implementation. With these results, again we confirm the 
lack of impact of the program on the shares of expenses on men, women, 
male and female children’s clothes. There is only one difference from the 
results of previous estimations. It is the change of the sign of the coefficient 
of the interaction term for children’s clothing.  The coefficient is now 
positive. This could suggest, that now a bigger share of the total budget is 
assigned to children’s clothing. However, coefficients do not show statistical 
significance. In addition, we can see that coefficients of the variable year2 are 
significant. It means, that during four years, expenditures on clothes in 
relation to the total expenditures of households increased for both treatment 
and control group. However, we cannot attribute this increase to the fact that 
treatment households were receiving an extra income from the program. Only 
one coefficient gains significance in the long term. It is the coefficient of the 
share of baby’s clothes. We can see, that due to receiving the subsidy, the 
share of baby’s clothes increased, on average, by 0.19.  
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Table 4. Long Term Difference in Differences Estimates. Program Impact on Spending 
Proportion 
of Good on 
Total 
Spending 
Men's Clothes 
Women's 
Clothes 
Male 
Children's 
Clothes 
Female 
Children's 
Clothes 
Baby's 
Clothes 
Food 
Restaurant 
Meals 
Toiletries Toys 
          Year 2 .013911** .020422*** .0212408*** .025952*** 0.0010882 -.028794*** 0.0002645 -.009120*** .0104924*** 
 
(.0056444) (.0046606) (.0036494) (.0037645) (.0059648) (.0020957) (.0003218) (.0005918) (.003906) 
          Treatment 0.0063283 0.0047264 -0.0044211 -0.0002183 .0129964*** .0068755*** .0005511*** -.001962*** 0.000559 
Long term (.0038907) (.0032004) (.0027193) (.0026934) (.0040557) (.0013673) (.0002101) (.000389) (.0028368) 
          TreatY -0.0064434 -0.0026841 0.0046534 0.003199 .019157*** .0045006** .0008476** .0012965** -0.0021036 
 
(.0048826) (.0040045) (.0035859) (.0036271) (.0063705) (.0022445) (.000345) (.0006402) (.0033439) 
          _cons .0456153*** .0645853*** .0785814*** .0652087*** .0768023*** .1169643*** .0014165*** .0307864*** .0133804** 
 
(.0083036) (.0066862) (.0057467) (.0064526) (.0101747) (.0035003) (.0005379) (.0009866) (.0053284) 
                   
R-square 0.1069019 0.0598832 0.0845628 0.0727733 0.0571391 0.0573901 0.0098906 0.050505 0.1060217 
N 3800 4112 5819 4676 1285 24359 24299 22562 978 
                    
Note: standard errors in parenthesis. Statistically different from zero at 1%(***), 5% (**) and 10%(*) level.  
	   
 
On the other hand, the program is affecting significantly non-assignable 
goods, such as food, restaurant meals, and toiletries. In the long term, in the 
group of the treatment households, there is an increase in the share of these 
goods caused by FA. On average, in the treatment group, there is an increase 
of 0.004 in the share of expenditures on food relative to the total spending. 
The significant increase of restaurant meals is, on average, 0.008, and the 
increase of toiletries equals, on average, 0.0012. These increases can be 
attributed to the program. Regarding these goods, we again find a sign of an 
anticipation effect, since the coefficient of the treatment variable shows 
statistically significant values. This means that, before money was transferred 
to the treatment group, treatment households may have been anticipating 
receiving the money, which had led them to allocate more resources to these 
goods compared to the control group.  
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VII. Concluding Remarks 
 
 
CCT’s became an important tool for poverty alleviation in Latin American 
countries since Oportunidades (formerly Progresa) started in Mexico in the 
90’s decade. Positive results, such as reduction of economic risk of the most 
vulnerable households has been evidenced during last years. Familias en 
Acción, modeling Oportunidades, has not been an exception. It has 
encouraged investments in human capital and children’s health in poor 
households in Colombia. The program has been able to benefit a wide range 
of poor rural, urban, and displaced population to such a great extent, that now 
the program has become a national public policy. While the positive effects 
on health and education have been studied, there are some other important 
issues that CCT’s are trying to affect that haven’t been analyzed enough. That 
is why this study seeks to test the income-pooling hypothesis and to measure 
changes in women’s bargaining power inside households. The section on the 
polling hypothesis complements different studies made in the past related to 
increases of household incomes due to public policy (Attanasio and Lechene, 
2002; Lundberg, Pollak and Wales, 1997). The role of women inside the 
household is more difficult to identify. Although, the results provide some 
evidence that the program positively affected women’s bargaining power 
inside the household.  
 
We performed a diff in diff model to see the change of the share of the 
household budget spent on certain assignable and non assignable goods in the 
short and long run.  In the short run, results showed that the program did not 
affect the spending pattern on most assignable goods, for instance clothing. 
However the spending pattern was altered when we look at the non-
assignable goods, such as food, and restaurant meals. With this information, 
we can reject the unitary model. Consequently, we assume that Colombian 
poor households do not pool their resources. In the case of women’s power, 
increases were not reflected in the assignable goods. However, theory 
suggests that women have more say in deciding how much to spend on food 
and restaurant meals. Also, usually the wife is in charge of the household 
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cleaning, thus the toiletries for household cleaning also increased. This results 
show evidence that women’s bargaining power inside the household 
increased.  
 
In the long run, results lead to similar conclusions. Four years after the 
program was implemented, households increased the spent share of food, 
restaurant meals, and toiletries. This evidences that households do not behave 
as a single unit, therefore increases of non-wage income reallocate 
household’s resources. Subsequently, the program increased the spending 
shares of baby clothes, an important assignable good that can give evidence 
of increases in women’s bargaining power. In summary, if we take into 
consideration spending patterns to measure increases of women’s bargaining 
power, the hypothesis that the program increased women’s decision making 
power can be confirmed.   
  
It is important to mention that results show a sign of an anticipation effect in 
the treatment group. Significant coefficients indicated that before the program 
the treatment group was spending more on food, restaurant meals, and 
toiletries than the control group. As mentioned before, due to the early start of 
the program, some treatment areas received the benefit before the beginning 
of the evaluation and some treatment households were already aware of 
receiving it in the future. This awareness of households may have created an 
anticipation bias that may underestimate the effect of the program. This bias 
is difficult to correct with the difference in differences model, so it is 
important to take into consideration its presence in the results. Nevertheless, 
signs of this bias are visible only in goods, such as food, restaurant meals, and 
toiletries, the same goods which were significantly affected by the program. 
The estimators may be biased downwards, which means the effect of the 
program may had been higher than the reported one, especially on the goods 
mentioned above. Households may have increased the spending on these 
goods after the program in a bigger proportion than the one presented in the 
results. This bias would be eliminated if we had retrospective data on 
spending patterns of households, however this information is not available. In 
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order to alleviate some of the bias in our regressions, we control for 
retrospective income, yearly income of 1999, 2000, and 2001.  
 
Even though, there is evidence rejecting the unitary model, assigning the 
proper model of resource allocation in households may be challenging.  
Household’s behavior is very case specific. It depends on a different set of 
factors that vary depending on time and space, for instant culture, gender 
roles, etc. By looking at changes in consumption pattern only, assigning a 
specific model to Colombian households’ behavior is not possible as it needs 
to be tested. However, analyzing Colombian households’ behavior under the 
light of the bargaining models for public policy purposes will increase 
effectiveness of the applications and improvements of welfare indicators.  
 
It is also important to highlight that changes of consumption pattern do not 
necessarily mean changes of bargaining power. With only household level 
data, as we had in our analysis, it is difficult to determine the cause of 
increases of expenditure. The changes of bargaining power may be a reason 
for that, but it can also be just an increase of the individual’s marginal 
productivity to a price change of certain goods or their substitutes (Doss, 
1996). Models may not reflect reality accurately, thus determining the power 
that woman can gain with the increase of her non-wage income may not be 
easy to assess. As Basu (2006) explains, “she (wife) could have all the power 
when it comes to choosing the children’s clothing and food, but have no say 
in other matters”. In this case, it is important that results are interpreted 
carefully. Efforts to increase women’s power inside the households are on the 
right path. Increases of share of expenditures on certain goods considered to 
be managed only by women, is a proper start of the improvements in women 
empowerment. It is important to use different measures in order to reiterate 
increases of women’s decision making power.  
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APENDIX 
 
Table 1. Report of Control Variables for the Diff in Diff Estimation 
Atlantic Region 
Central Region 
Material Walls: Brick 
Material Walls: Mud 
Material Walls: Bark Tree 
Material Walls: Wood 
Material Walls: Vegetables 
Material Walls: Residuals 
No Walls 
Residency Type: House 
Own House 
Rented House 
Occupied House 
House in Usufruct 
Electricity in the HH 
Gas in the HH 
Sewerage in the HH 
Fridge in the HH 
Total Number people in the HH 
Total Number people in the HH2 
Age Female Household 
Age Head of the Household 
Gender Head of the Household 
Single Parent Household 
Pregnant Woman inside the HH 
Number of Children inside the HH 
Number of children inside the HH2 
Head of the Household: Incomplete Primary School  
Head of the Household: Complete Primary School  
Head of the Household: Incomplete Secondary School  
Head of the Household: Complete Secondary School  
Head of the Household: Affiliated to Health Insurance 
Death of a Family Member in the Last year 
Natural Disaster in the last year 
Household Affected by violent Conflict in the Last year 
Total income 1999 
Total Income 2000 
Total Income 2001 
Total Income 
 
 
 
 
